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This research explores how the framing of tasks affects an individual’s psychological 
employment of thinking-style balance in performing those tasks. The methodology 
utilizes multivariant experimentation with military officers. The research analyzes the 
impact of how a commander frames a problem to a subordinate. More specifically, the 
work seeks to parse the effect of linear (analytical) framing, nonlinear (balanced) 
framing, or no additional frame (control). There were six key findings: military decision 
makers have a baseline linear thinking bias; a majority of the participants fell below the 
threshold for being moderately versatile thinkers; American participants had a stronger 
baseline linear bias than international participants; the impact of problem framing on 
overall thinking style was minimal; the linear treatment group experienced significantly 
lower emotional thinking scores; and the linear treatment group took significantly longer 
to complete the experiment. It was concluded that military decision makers have a strong 
linear bias that is not easily influenced by problem framing. It was also concluded that 
linear framing has a significant impact on decision-making time and emotional thinking. 
In an effort to reduce the military decision maker linear bias, it is recommended that 
professional military education include a significant increase in nonlinear thought 
processes, such as design thinking. It is also recommended that incentive structures be 
updated to create and promote an organizational culture that supports a linear/nonlinear 
balanced thinking approach to problem solving. 
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The aim of this thesis is to identify the degree to which problem framing affects 
an individual’s decision-making approach and thinking style. Problem framing is the 
conceptual interpretation of a problem, and serves to set boundaries for decision makers 
(Dzbor & Zdrahal, 2002). In a military context, “the art of framing the problem is the art 
of seeing the essential and relevant among the trivial and irrelevant” (Clark & Blew, 
2008, p. 1). The problem framing studied in this research refers to a superior’s definition 
of a problem to a subordinate. This form of framing is typically delivered through the 
commander’s guidance, providing the subordinate with an initial conceptual 
understanding of the problem space. Moreover, the commander’s guidance has the 
potential to influence a subordinate’s cognitive thought process when solving the 
problem, impacting the subordinate’s use of linear and nonlinear thinking styles. 
Particularly in the military, there is a heavy emphasis on linear thinking and a 
professional culture that fosters a quantitative and predictive worldview (Schmidt, 2013). 
For example, in the United States military, there is an overwhelming emphasis on 
immediate tactical success versus long-term effects (Bethel, 2013). Linear thinkers with a 
tactical focus are prone to oversimplify problems by holding many things constant by 
assumption. While this approach may yield tactical victory, it fails to address more 
fundamental factors that may have a strategic impact beyond the tactical problem. 
Standard officer education reflects this shortsightedness, where little emphasis is placed 
on developing nonlinear thinking skills. Current Officer Efficiency Reports used by the 
U.S. Army promote conformity and fail to recognize the importance of strategic thinking 
(Laich & Young, 2011; Wolters, Grome, & Hinds, 2013, p. 2). I have found that 
Personnel Evaluation Reports used by the Canadian Armed Forces suffer the same 
shortcomings and incentivize conformity and linear thought over nonlinear thinking 




critically analyzed, which in turn promotes situational awareness that extends beyond the 
tactical level, ultimately improving strategic thought.   
The preponderance of linear thinking in contemporary militaries is profound. As 
pointed out by Arquilla (2008, p. xi), the uncompromising adherence to a philosophy of 
overwhelming force has blurred the perception of twenty-first century warfare. While this 
misperception is largely attributed to an inherent resistance to organizational change 
(Arquilla, 2008; Gartner, 1997, p. 23), the failure to alter strategic policy is also a 
function of a military culture that lacks creativity and nonlinear thought and thus fails to 
change strategic thinking. In a speech on military transformation shortly after the 
September 11 attacks, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called for a need to think 
creatively in an effort to prepare for new challenges (Shanker, 2002). Both Rumsfeld and 
Arquilla (2008) are critical of military trends that time and time again display an aptitude 
for emulating the past, rather than preparing for the future. This thesis reaffirms those 
ideas by arguing that a deficiency in nonlinear thinking is a root cause of this 
phenomenon.   
Many have identified the potential benefits of nonlinear thinking in the military 
(Beyerchen, 1992; Bousquet, 2009; Boyd, 1996; Spinney, 2005; Spinney, 1999). 
Nonlinear thinking is highly influential to successful innovation, particularly in 
developing new doctrine; network-centric warfare and swarming are recent prominent 
examples (Bousquet, 2009). Furthermore, Bousquet and others, such as Spinney (2005), 
highlight how military organizations can even turn highly effective nonlinear processes 
into nonadaptive organizational paradigms. For instance, Boyd’s (1996) Observe–Orient–
Decide–Act (OODA) loop is widely acclaimed throughout the U.S. military (Bousquet, 
2009), and I have found that phrases such as “you need to get inside your enemy’s 
OODA loop” are commonplace in the military lexicon. While seemingly linear and 
analytical on the surface, the OODA loop is actually a highly nonlinear co-evolutionary 
process (Spinney, 1999). A collaborator of Boyd, Spinney (2005) offers this insightful 




The most dangerous internal state of an OODA loop occurs when the 
Orientation process becomes so powerful that it force fits the organism’s 
observations into fitting a preconceived template, even when those 
observations threaten the relevance of that template. (p. 1) 
Simply put, the default linear thinking approach is applied to the nonlinear and 
unpredictable OODA loop concept, ultimately reducing the powerful potential of the 
OODA decision-making cycle.  
Given the current trends of chaos, uncertainty, and complexity facing modern 
militaries, there is an unprecedented need to adopt a dualistic linear/nonlinear thinking 
approach (Vance, 2013). Current professional military education does not emphasize 
nonlinear thinking skills such as flexibility, innovation, and entrepreneurship to exploit 
effectively the tools of the revolution in military affairs. Particularly when forced to make 
rapid decisions with imperfect information, military personnel who rely solely on 
traditional linear thinking approaches may not compete effectively against an opponent 
who employs alternative nonlinear decision-making tools such as intuition, emotion, 
imagination, and creativity (Vance, 2013).  
Nonlinear thinking represents a mix of critical ways to approach a problem. All 
too often, nonlinear thinking is reduced to creativity, but current literature explains seven 
unique components: intuition, insight, creativity, flexibility, imagination, emotion, and 
values (Vance, 2013, p. 207). A balance between these nonlinear thinking traits and 
traditional linear thought is a key component when facing the nonlinear threats of the 
future. The term thinking style balance is used throughout the thesis. Thinking style 
refers to an individual’s predominant pattern when perceiving, understanding, and 
solving problems (Vance, 2013, p. 205). For this study, thinking style balance refers to an 
individual’s use of two styles of thinking: linear and nonlinear. The balance reflects 
where a decision maker is on a spectrum of linear and nonlinear thought when solving a 
problem. This is discussed in detail in Chapters III and IV. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II outlines recent literature on linear and 
nonlinear thinking, strategic thinking and creativity, cognitive and psychological aspects 




provides a brief overview of the experiment. Chapter IV presents the data, and highlights 
the key findings from the data analysis. Chapter V discusses the six key findings of the 
experiment and relates them to current literature. Chapter VI presents the conclusion and 
recommendations for future research. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research conducted here explores how the framing of tasks affects an 
individual’s psychological employment of thinking style balance in performing those 
tasks. More specifically, the following three hypotheses are experimentally tested to 
answer this research question. 
(1) Hypothesis One: Military decision makers have a baseline thinking style 
that favors linear thinking over nonlinear thinking.   
Hypothesis One suggests that linear thinking is fostered, reinforced, and rewarded 
as soldiers progress through their careers. As a result of a constant exposure to linear 
thinking, it is hypothesized that military decision makers develop a baseline thinking 
style that is biased toward linear over nonlinear thinking. While any military decision 
maker retains freedom of thought and an ability to choose his thinking style when 
problem solving, it is hypothesized that the impact of professional military education 
(PME), military culture, and organizational norms heavily influence one’s thought 
processes.   
(2) Hypothesis Two: The way a problem is framed affects the thinking style 
balance employed by the military decision maker. 
Hypothesis Two suggests that the simple framing of the problem has a significant 
impact on the thinking style balance employed by the decision maker. If a commander 
stresses step-by-step doctrinal procedures and prescriptive analytical processes, it is 
hypothesized that the subordinate will favor linear thinking when problem solving. If, on 
the other hand, the commander provides latitude and promotes collaboration, 
imagination, creativity, and other nonlinear traits, it is hypothesized that the subordinate 




(3) Hypothesis Three: When a decision maker is given linear guidance, they 
take longer to solve a problem than if given nonlinear guidance. 
The third hypothesis suggests that linear thinking—as a result of linear 
guidance—results in more time taken to solve a problem. The premise of this hypothesis 
is that problem solvers become more concerned with the linear process they are directed 
to follow, rather than focusing on developing a quality solution. It can be argued that in 
highly stressful situations such as combat, linear thinking—in the form of well-rehearsed 
drills and standard operating procedures—could indeed be the preferred course of action. 
The issue, however, is that this mindset can be carried into less stressful situations where 
quick linear thought may not be optimal.  
This research has direct and actionable benefits to the military. If Hypothesis One 
is supported by the results, PME can be adjusted to create a more balanced thinking style 
in military decision makers. It is important to note, however, that the only way to correct 
this shortfall would be through a dedicated and focused shift in current training and 
development practices. Officers could potentially benefit from exposure to nonlinear 
thinking from the very start of their careers. It is important to gain an early understanding 
of the benefits of nonlinear thinking, especially with respect to strategic thought and 
innovation. The goal is not to focus on nonlinear thinking exclusively; rather, it is to shift 
thinking style balance away from linearity towards the center. If Hypothesis Two is 
supported, military leaders can frame problems in a manner that promotes a balanced 
thinking style. Such a shift in problem framing requires leaders who understand the value 
of balanced thinking and are catalysts for change. With a focus on shifting PME, military 
organizations can begin to create the type of thinking warriors and organizational cultures 
that will guide the way forward for balanced thinking. If Hypothesis Three is supported, 
it will provide further incentive to introduce nonlinear thinking into PME and military 









A. LINEAR AND NONLINEAR THINKING 
A balanced approach between linear and nonlinear thinking provides a “powerful 
synergy” toward optimal military strategic thinking and decision making (Vance, 2013, p. 
205; Schmidt, 2013, p. 220). The military profession stresses linear thought and a 
quantitative approach to problem solving; however, nonlinear thinking and qualitative 
methods are equally important to the military decision maker (Bousquet, 2009; Boyd, 
1996; Beyerchen, 1992; Spinney, 2005; Spinney, 1999; Wolters et al., 2013). 
Unfortunately current professional military education doctrine fails to strike a balance 
between linear and nonlinear thinking, favoring the former throughout a military career. 
As a starting point, it is important to provide benchmark definitions for both linear and 
nonlinear thinking: 
Linear Thinking: Thoughts progressing in an orderly, logical line or 
direction, inferred from prior thoughts, and based on tangible or 
observable data. Common terms for this thinking orientation include 
analysis, logic, reason, and inference. 
Nonlinear Thinking: A process that can generate a vision of what is 
possible beyond the traditional way of doing things that otherwise restrain 
or “box in” our alternatives. The nonlinear thinking orientation is 
qualitative and holistic. (Vance, 2013, pp. 205–207) 
The strength of this nonlinear thinking definition is that it is grounded in seven 
distinct thinking styles that have been identified as key dimensions to nonlinear thought: 
intuition, insight, creativity, flexibility, imagination, emotion, and values (Vance, 2013, 
p. 207). Furthermore, the same literature identifies a means of measuring an individual’s 
linear and nonlinear thinking style, referred to as the Linear/Nonlinear Multidimensional 
Thinking Style Assessment (LNMTSA; Vance, 2013). This profile assessment is used for 
part of the experiment in this thesis, providing insight for Hypotheses One and Two. This 




The military is hungry for strategic thinkers, and professional military education 
should foster the necessary skills in flexibility, innovation, and entrepreneurship that 
support strategic thought in current and future leaders (Vance, 2013, p. 203). Sometimes 
referred to as the age of science, there is a tendency—especially within the military—to 
tackle all problems with a systematic linear approach (Conklin, 1996). As a matter of 
fact, both U.S. and Canadian professional military education is focused exclusively on 
linear approaches to problem solving—the military decision-making process (MDMP) 
and operational planning process (OPP), respectively. Recent literature points to a 
realization that these dogmatic processes are stifling creativity and resulting in 
suboptimal decision making (Runyon, 2004).   
This chapter begins with an explanation of linear and nonlinear thinking. These 
labels are often used without clear definition, and literature from Vance (2013) clarifies 
the terms for this thesis. A key argument for bolstering military nonlinear thinking is the 
important role it plays in strategic thought. The next section explains strategic thinking 
and creativity, with a focus on differentiating between strategy, strategic planning, and 
true strategic thought. The third section presents recent literature on cognitive and 
psychological aspects of thinking, with a focus on the pitfalls for the military decision 
maker. The final section introduces the merits of experimentation as a research 
methodology. 
The necessity for nonlinear thinking to deal with the complexity of warfare dates 
all the way back to Sun Tzu, the Byzantine Army, and Clausewitz. In stark contrast to the 
contemporary philosophy of overwhelming force, all three of these examples demonstrate 
the importance of nonlinear thinking in warfare. Sun Tzu’s (500 BCE/1963) ideas on 
deception, subduing the enemy without fighting, and out-maneuvering an adversary 
(physically and psychologically) are nonlinear concepts that have remained highly 
relevant for well over two thousand years. Likewise, the Byzantine Strategikon (Maurice, 
580−610/1984) spoke of doctrinal innovation with the combination of horse archers and 




Byzantine’s abilities to learn from their enemies and apply an economy of force 
philosophy were nonlinear concepts that were key to their success (Petersen, 1992). 
Clausewitz also highlighted the importance of nonlinear thought; however, the 
overwhelming linear approach employed in military analysis has resulted in a failure to 
effectively address the intended meaning of ends–ways–means (Beyerchen, 1992). The 
true nonlinear conception “is that the conduct of any war affects its character, and its 
altered character feeds back into the political ends that guide its content” (Beyerchen, 
1992, pp. 68–69). The remarkable trinity (von Clausewitz, 1832/1976) between violence, 
hatred, and enmity; uncertainty, chance, and probability; and political purpose is another 
Clausewitzian metaphor that has been attenuated due to a linear view on a nonlinear 
concept (Beyerchen, 1992, p. 69). A retraining of our intuition is recommended with an 
emphasis on nonlinear thinking.  “The overall pattern is clear: war seen as a nonlinear 
phenomenon—as Clausewitz sees it—is inherently unpredictable by analytical means” 
(Beyerchen, 1992, p. 90). In the same light, additional literature suggests that the 
qualitative approach is a fundamental aspect of strategic thought. Military culture 
conflates strategic thought with a flawed quantitative approach (Schmidt, 2013). To 
further compound the problem, inward-looking strategic thinking that questions the 
military’s approach to problem solving is suppressed, leaving a system that promotes 
quantitative linear thought (Schmidt, 2013).  
Studies of military decision making (Klein, 1989; Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984, 
1985; Van Evera, 1984; Van Riper, 2013) often claim that military organizations employ 
suboptimal decision-making. In regard to linear thinking, critics of the military tend to 
make two central claims. First, military organizations have a strong focus on linear rather 
than nonlinear thinking. This dominating characteristic is introduced in professional 
military education, reinforced in the military work environment, and rarely questioned or 
challenged. The military incentive system is geared towards rewarding individuals who 
adhere to standard analytical processes. These rewards are often in the form of courses 




processes. Moreover, this linear thought favors offensive action and results in a failure to 
learn from past experiences (Posen, 1984).   
A second criticism of military decision making made by critics is that a focus on 
linear thinking subsequently inhibits innovative and strategic thought. The military 
culture is indeed caught in a paradox. While there is apparently a need for military 
strategic thinkers, it is the intrinsic cultural bias toward linear thinking that is inhibiting 
strategic thought and optimum decision-making. 
B. STRATEGIC THINKING AND CREATIVITY 
A clear definition of strategic thinking is required in order to provide context for 
the research question. The difference between strategy and strategic thinking is also 
presented. As a concept, strategy is surprisingly hard to define, characterized as a process 
of adaptation in a world of uncertainty and ambiguity (Murray & Grimsley, 1994, p. 1). 
In another light, strategy can be described as the art that bridges the gap between 
knowledge and experience, allowing the strategist to apply knowledge into action and 
action into knowledge (Greene, 2006, p. xxii). In a specific military Clausewitzian 
context of ends–ways–means, strategy is “the direction and use made of means by chosen 
ways in order to achieve desired ends” (Gray, 2010, p. 18). Despite the wide scope of 
definitions, strategy is not synonymous with, or indicative of, strategic thinking (Van 
Riper, 2013). Furthermore, the definition of strategic thinking is equally broad and open 
to interpretation. The following definition of military strategic thinking provides a 
baseline for this research: 
Strategic thinking employs a leader’s wisdom—gained through experience 
and education—to: 
• Assist in selecting the ways and means needed to support the achievement 
of national policy goals (ends); select the military strategy, that is, the 
ways and means required to accomplish the goals (ends) of national 
security strategy; and plan for and execute campaigns and operations that 
advance that strategy. 
• Uncover or discern the logic that holds together seemingly intractable and 
ill-defined problems and develop a counter-logic that resolves them. (Van 




The strength of this definition is the scope. Rather than simply focusing on 
strategic thinking as a means of exercising strategy, the second sub-bullet opens the 
definition to a wide range of questions encountered by the military decision maker.  
It is also important to distinguish between strategic planning and strategic 
thinking, as these terms are all too often confused. Strategic planning is simply an 
analytical process that programs already identified strategies (Mintzberg, 1994). Strategic 
thinking, however, is a “synthesizing process, utilizing intuition and creativity” (Liedtka, 
1998, p. 121). Furthermore, strategic planning and strategic thinking are incompatible, 
drawing a dichotomy between analytical problem solving and creativity in strategy-
making (Liedtka, 1998, p. 121). This brings up an interesting paradox. Strategic planning 
is a necessary exercise in any military enterprise and is viewed as an analytical process. 
On the other hand, strategic thinking is anything but a solely analytical exercise. Given 
the inherent incompatibility between strategic planning and strategic thinking, the two 
undermine rather than complement one another.   
Creativity is a core component of strategic thinking; however, there is little 
literature that goes beyond the scope of the individual creative genius (Sanders, 2013). Of 
particular interest to this thesis are the conceptual blocks and organizational culture 
aspects that affect creativity and other elements of nonlinear thinking. There are so-called 
blocks to creativity that come in forms that are perceptual, emotional, cultural, 
environmental, intellectual, and expressive (Adams, 2001). The research focus on linear 
versus nonlinear thinking is centered on intellectual blocks, while the military component 
of the question touches on cultural, environmental, emotional, expressive, and perceptual 
blocks.   
Individual creativity represents a four-layer framework that encompasses 
cognition, emotion, the person as a whole, and the environment (Sanders, 2013). While 
each layer of the framework has significant implications on creativity, this thesis focuses 
on the cognition aspect, specifically the structure of thinking—linear versus nonlinear. It 
is important to note, however, that the other layers of the framework have profound 




organizational culture aspects of the SOF enterprise that may influence the type of 
thinking that predominates the working environment. The military incentive structure—
requirements for promotion, for example—may also stimulate aspects of the emotional 
framework that impact how an individual thinks. The point to note is that even with a 
focus on linear and nonlinear thinking, creativity and the other components of nonlinear 
thinking cannot be viewed in an isolated cognitive framework. 
C. COGNITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 
Recent literature on human cognition identifies two systems of thinking—System 
1 and System 2—also referred to as fast and slow thinking, respectively (Kahneman, 
2011). A third system of thinking is also discussed in the literature, referring to 
operational design and wicked problem territory (Roberts, 2000; Van Riper, 2013). Of 
particular interest is the complexity of intuitive and unconscious processes, and how they 
subsequently relate to the heuristics and biases of judgment. A key weakness of System 1 
is an inability to think statistically. The challenges posed by this weakness are “excessive 
confidence in what we believe we know, and our apparent inability to acknowledge the 
full extent of our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in” (Kahneman, 
2011, p. 14). Such a weakness should be of grave concern to the SOF decision maker, 
and is directly related to linear and nonlinear thinking. 
In their seminal work on decision-making, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) assert, 
“people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks 
of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgment operations” (p. 1). 
While these heuristics can indeed simplify decision-making, they can also lead to 
systematic errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974, p. 1). There are three identified heuristics 
that influence the decision maker: representativeness, availability, and adjustment and 
anchoring (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). While the heuristics—and the subsequent 
biases they promulgate—can offer convenience and efficiency to the decision maker, 




In addition, there are both normative and descriptive aspects of decision making 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). This is especially important to this thesis; normative 
analysis addresses rationality and logic (linear thinking), whereas descriptive analysis 
focuses on beliefs and preferences as they actually are (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). 
This contrast between normative and descriptive aspects of decision making is essential 
to the analysis of the SOF decision maker. Specifically, Kahneman and Tversky (1983) 
explain the framing of outcomes. They reveal that when a problem is viewed in a losses 
frame, decision makers are more risk seeking. Conversely, when presented in a gains 
frame, decision makers are more risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). 
While this thesis is not focused on the cognitive aspects of the brain that influence 
how we think, it is important to have a basic understanding of the cognitive literature, 
particularly the three systems of thinking. Of particular importance to this research thesis 
is the fact that “prolonged practice” and “skill” are also critical ingredients of intuition, 
offering a more holistic view of what forms intuitive judgment (Kahneman, 2011). The 
ramifications of the role of intuition to both linear and nonlinear thinking are discussed in 
greater detail in this thesis.  
D. EXPERIMENTATION 
The research guiding this thesis explores how the framing of tasks affects an 
individual’s psychological employment of thinking style balance in performing those 
tasks. This question is particularly suited to experimental methods. The strengths of these 
methods are described as follows:  
The primary advantage of experiments is that they offer unparalleled 
control over the variables of interest. This is because the experimental 
method permits the systematic manipulation of variables in a controlled 
environment with randomly assigned subjects. Experiments thus offer the 
highest degree of internal validity; experimenters can be pretty confident 
that outcomes differ on the basis of the variables manipulated 





An experiment is the preferred mechanism to study the dependent variable in this 
thesis: the thinking style balance of the military problem solver. The experiment is aimed 
at identifying whether the way a problem is framed affects an individual’s psychological 
perception of thinking style balance. 
If militaries aim to increase strategic thinking abilities within their respective 
organizations, it is important to understand what independent variables impact strategic 
thought and thinking style balance. Within the military, this is a relatively young field of 
research. Commanders know that they want strategic thinkers, but little has been done to 
foster the necessary skills within the existing PME framework. Given the military 
preference for linear thinking and analytical problem solving, identifying how problem 
framing impacts thinking style balance is the first step towards an improved PME system 
to meet the needs of future commanders.   
E. THE LINEAR THINKING VICIOUS CYCLE 
There is a vicious cycle that promulgates military linear thinking that requires 
further explanation. The apparent lack of balanced thinking in the military, and the 
subsequent deficiency in strategic thought, can be classified as a wicked problem. First 
and foremost, there is no definitive formulation of the problem itself—a key tenet of a 
wicked problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). In fact, a clear and concise formulation of the 
problem is essentially, the problem. It is assumed that there is indeed a deficiency in 
military strategic thinking, but what exactly does this entail?  Is the military organization 
equipped and organized to facilitate strategic thought?  Are the individual decision 
makers selected, trained, and encouraged to think strategically?  Does the organizational 
culture foster and value an environment that is conducive to thinking strategically?  It is 
quickly apparent that any discussion of strategic thinking has numerous facets, including, 
but not limited to, personnel selection, organizational culture, cognitive abilities, risk 
aversion, incentive structures, working environment, and workload. This thesis is not an 
in-depth analysis of how to solve this problem; rather, it focuses on understanding the 




trends in thinking style balance is the first step to developing actionable courses of action 
to improve strategic thinking. 
The problem space is best explained using a causal loop diagram (CLD). Figure 1 
presents the cycle in the form of a complex adaptive system formed by three reinforcing 
loops. The primary loop is R1, while R2 and R3 reinforce key variables. Since a key 
issue is hypothesized to be an over-focus on linear thinking, the starting point of the 
narrative is “level of linear thinking.”  Each arrow in the CLD is annotated with either an 
“s” or an “o.”  The “s” designation means that as the first entity moves in one direction, 
the second entity connected by the arrow changes in the same direction (i.e., both 
increase). The “o” designation means that they move in opposite directions (i.e., as one 
increases, the other decreases).  
 




Referring to R1 within Figure 2, as the level of linear thinking increases, the level 
of nonlinear thinking decreases. This is due to the balance of individual linear and 
nonlinear thinking abilities (Vance, 2013). As described by Adams (2001), a common 
intellectual block is the choice of problem-solving language. As an officer increases his 
reliance on linear thinking and analytical problem solving, he subsequently reduces his 
reliance and openness to nonlinear thinking. As the level of nonlinear thinking decreases, 
an officer’s level of creativity also decreases. Creativity is both a result of nonlinear 
thinking and a requirement for strategic thought (Sanders, 2013). As the level of 
creativity decreases, the level of strategic thinking also decreases. Finally, as the level of 
strategic thinking decreases, the level of linear thinking further increases, thereby 
reinforcing the R1 loop. It is important to view the R1 loop at the individual officer’s 
cognition level. This model attempts to describe how the brain of the officer approaches 
problem solving, ultimately leading to increased linear thinking and decreased strategic 
thinking.   
The important question to address is, why is the level of linear thinking increasing 
to set off the R1 loop?  Part of the answer is explained by the loop depicted as R2. As the 
level of linear thinking increases, the level of career-positive reinforcement increases. 
The reason for this is that junior officers are primarily assessed on their abilities to apply 
the linear thinking promulgated by their early military education and training. As an 
officer completes more PME, he is ranked higher among his peers, which directly 
corresponds to an increase in probability of promotion. As a result of being promoted, the 
officer continues to emphasize the performance that led to his success; therefore, the level 
of linear thinking further increases. It becomes obvious that the R2 loop is directly 
reinforcing an increase in the level of linear thinking, which in turn drives R1. While the 
R1 loop focuses on individual officer cognition, the R2 loop describes the typical 
incentive structure in military organizations. An increased level of linear thinking 
inherently links the two loops. 
Another variable in R1 that is influenced by an additional loop is the level of 




number of conceptual blocks experienced by the officer increases. As these conceptual 
blocks increase, the level of nonlinear thinking further decreases. The number of 
conceptual blocks (in R3) is also influenced by R2. As the level of career positive 
reinforcement and number of PME opportunities increases, the number of conceptual 
blocks also increases. This can be attributed to officers being reinforced by incentives 
following their application of linear thinking skills. As officers are rewarded for their 
linear thinking, they reproduce their behavior and focus even more on linear thinking. 
This, in turn, increases conceptual blocks as described my Adams (2001). This increase 
in conceptual blocks further decreases the level of nonlinear thinking, fortifying the 
vicious cycle in R1. 
This causal loop diagram does not propose that linear thinking is completely 
endemic throughout the military. It simply attempts to identify a relationship between 
military thinking, PME opportunities, and incentive structures. If the findings do indicate 
a higher-than-optimal level of linear thinking in military offices, such a model could 
serve as a start state for identifying intervention points. 
The theory presented in Chapter II provides the building blocks for the 
methodology and thesis hypotheses. Following Chapter II’s definition of both linear and 
nonlinear thinking, and an explanation of the importance of thinking style balance in 










This chapter explains the experimental methodology used in this thesis. The 
methodology builds on previous research by Vance (2013) and utilizes the 
Linear/Nonlinear Multidimensional Thinking Style Assessment (LNMTSA). The overall 
experiment sequence is presented, followed by the vignette and three treatments. Each of 
the three hypotheses are then discussed in greater detail. Appendix B outlines the detailed 
experiment, including the questions used for the LNMTSA (Vance, 2013).   
B. PARTICIPANTS 
Before discussing the methodology, it is necessary to explain the participants for 
the experiment. In accordance with the approved Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) application (Appendix A), participants were recruited 
from the NPS student body via email. All participants were volunteers, with no incentives 
offered for participation. It is important to note that the participants are not a typical cross 
section of the military population. First and foremost, all participants were O-3 or O-4 
rank. While employment may differ between nations and services, these officers are 
typically post-sub-unit command. This means that they have commanded one level below 
unit command (e.g., a company or squadron). Furthermore, the officers in the experiment 
are a diverse group from around the world, with 76% being members of the U.S. Military 
and 24% being military members from nations other than the United States. While the 
multinational makeup of the participants was not a goal of the experiment, this 
independent variable (nationality) offers a unique look into baseline thinking styles 
across borders. Finally, all participants are enrolled in a postgraduate degree program at 
NPS. Although application criteria can once again vary by country and service, the 
selection for these positions is typically competitive and focused on top performers in 
their respective fields. It is, therefore, reasonable to consider that the participants are a 
self-selected nonrandom sample that may differ significantly from the broader population 




have “above average” potential for employment at higher ranks; otherwise, they would 
not be selected for postgraduate studies.   
C. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The thesis methodology utilizes multivariant experimentation as depicted in 
Figure 2. The treatment represents a commander framing a problem to a subordinate by 
giving specific commander’s guidance on his intent. The independent variable is the 
treatment: the variation in the way the problem is framed. The three conditions include 
linear (analytical), nonlinear (balanced), or control (no extra frame). The dependent 
variables are the linear/nonlinear thinking style balance, linear/nonlinear component self-
assessment scores, and time taken to complete the experiment. Officers begin by 
completing 24 of the 48 questions from the Linear/Nonlinear Multidimensional Thinking 
Style Assessment (LNMTSA; Vance, 2013). This self-assessment diagnostic tool aims to 
identify an individual’s degree of overall thinking style balance prior to any treatment. 
This tool also provides a score for each of the seven components of nonlinear thinking: 
intuition, insights, creativity, flexibility, imagination, emotion, and values (Vance, 2013, 
p. 207). Treatment groups are randomly divided into three comparably sized groups: 
linear, balanced, and a control.   
All three groups are presented with the same problem-solving vignette (shown in 
the following section). Officers are directed to solve the problem in accordance with the 
commander’s guidance provided in the treatment. The intent is for the officers to reflect 
on the treatment and apply the commander’s guidance to their problem-solving approach. 
The aim of this step is to reinforce the respective treatments. Officers are then asked to 
provide an overview of how they would choose to solve the problem, without any 
constraints or requirements.  
The linear group receives linear guidance, focused on completing the task in a 
very logical and straightforward manner. The balanced group receives guidance that 
focuses on a balanced design approach, stressing several components of nonlinear 




This dependent variable aims to identify how the officer solves the problem—for 
instance, analytically, graphically, pictorially, written, or a combination. Finally, the 
officers complete the second half of the LNMTSA. This dependent variable aims to 
identify whether the officer self-identifies a different linear/nonlinear balance, or change 
in any nonlinear thinking component, based on the treatment. The experiment is 
discussed using pre-vignette and post-vignette terminology. Pre-vignette refers to the 
results from the initial LNMTSA self-assessment and identifies the baseline thinking 
style for each officer. Post-vignette refers to the results after the treatments are provided 
and refers to the second half of the LNMTSA.   
The following vignette is provided to each participant. 
You are one of four company commanders in a battalion-size unit that is 
preparing for an upcoming deployment. Given the proposed area of operations and other 
competing missions, your commander expects that he will not receive unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) support that would typically be provided. He is reluctant to conduct the 
mission without UAS support due to the increased risk to force and decreased situational 
awareness in his operations center. Your commander has decided that an integral UAS 
capability within the battalion is the only way to ensure some level of UAS coverage for 
the upcoming mission. He also believes that a lack of external UAS support will continue 
in the coming years. Your commander has tasked you with standing up this new 
capability within your company. In order to force generate the required UAS personnel 
to man this new capability, he has authorized you to draw 15 non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) from the other three companies to be employed outside their military 
occupational specialties (MOSs).   
Your immediate task is to develop a course of action to select the most suitable 
individuals. Your commander stresses that given the autonomy and technical complexity 
of this capability, the prospective operators must have well-above-average cognitive 
abilities.  
Your commanding officer called you into his office and provided the following 




1. Control Group Commander’s Guidance 
You are familiar with my expectations and decision-making process. Proceed with 
the task of selecting 15 NCOs for this new capability. 
2. Linear Group Commander’s Guidance 
You are familiar with my expectations and decision-making process. Proceed with 
the task of selecting 15 NCOs for this new capability. You know I like to see logic laid out 
in a step-by-step methodical process that follows our established doctrinal guidelines and 
unit SOPs. As always, I want to see your mission analysis as it will increase the 
confidence of my decision. Brief me weekly on your progress and keep me abreast of any 
issues you encounter. 
3.  Balanced Group Commander’s Guidance 
You are familiar with my expectations and decision-making process. Proceed with 
the task of selecting 15 NCOs for this new capability. Use existing unit doctrine and 
standard operating procedures as a departure point, but do not hesitate to include 
creative options for completing the task. I encourage you to collaborate with your peers 





Figure 2.  Research Methodology 
D. EXPLANATION OF HYPOTHESES 
Before presenting the results, I briefly revisit the hypotheses and show how they 
link to the empirical study. 
1. Explanation of Hypothesis One 
The first step of the experiment is independent of the vignette, and therefore 
captures the subject’s baseline thinking style. It is hypothesized that this baseline score is 
dependent on the culmination of his formal education, PME, work experience, military 
culture, and any other factors that have influenced his decision-making approach.   
• Hypothesis One: Military decision makers have a baseline thinking style 




Military officers at the O-3 and O-4 levels have been exposed to linear thinking 
and analytical problem solving throughout their PME careers. It is unlikely that they have 
received any formal or informal training in nonlinear thinking. Furthermore, doctrinal 
processes, standard operation procedures (SOPs), and military culture typically favor 
linear thinking. While there are no civilian subjects with which to compare the baseline 
scores of the military officers, the LNMTSA (Vance, 2013) provides a score that 
indicates the degree to which participants default to linear thinking over nonlinear 
thinking. 
For the first step of the study, the only independent variable to the baseline 
thinking style score is the nationality of the participants. Seventy-six percent of 
participants were from the United States. Since the remaining 24% of the participants 
were from numerous countries (mostly western European), they are described as “non-
U.S.” throughout the data analysis. The aim of the first step is to examine whether 
military decision makers favor linear over nonlinear thinking, and whether there is a 
difference in the baseline linear/nonlinear thinking style balance between U.S. and non-
U.S. participants.  
2. Explanation of Hypothesis Two 
The second step of the experiment involves a common vignette for all 
participants, followed by one of three treatments: control, linear, and nonlinear. Subjects 
were randomly selected for each of the three treatments, with 32 participants receiving 
the control, 33 receiving the linear treatment, and 33 receiving the nonlinear treatment. 
The total sample size was 98 participants.   
• Hypothesis Two: The way a problem is framed affects the thinking style 
balance employed by the military decision maker. 
The aim of step of this step is to determine the degree to which problem framing 
affects an individual’s decision making and thinking style balance. A key aspect of 
military decision making comes in the form of a commander’s guidance. This is typically 
the opportunity for a military commander to articulate his intent, set constraints and 




the principle of mission command, the commander will avoid telling his subordinate how 
to solve the problem. With a clear indication of what needs to be accomplished, it should 
be left to the decision maker to decide how the problem is solved—in accordance with 
the aforementioned commander’s guidance.   
This step of the experiment is designed to examine whether the content of a 
commander’s guidance can alter the baseline thinking style scores from Step One. 
Specifically, does a linear commander’s guidance cause the officer to apply a more linear 
problem-solving approach than identified in the baseline (pre-vignette)?  Likewise, does a 
nonlinear commander’s guidance result in a shift towards a more nonlinear approach 
when compared to baseline scores?  In addition to whether subjects have an overall shift 
towards more linear or nonlinear thinking styles, it is also possible to examine the seven 
components of nonlinear thinking separately to determine if any of them are particularly 
sensitive to commander’s guidance. To fully operationalize this hypothesis, each of the 
three subject groups are given five minutes to reflect on their respective commander’s 
guidance and identify how they would proceed with solving the problem identified in the 
vignette. All participants are then presented with another 24 questions from the 
LNMTSA (Vance, 2013), which provides post-vignette scores to compare to the 
baselines.   
3. Explanation of Hypothesis Three 
The time taken to complete the experiment is another dependent variable that 
provides valuable insight into the role of problem framing in military decision-making.   
• Hypothesis Three: When a decision maker is given linear guidance, they 
take longer to solve a problem than if given nonlinear guidance. 
The elapsed time to complete the experiment is recorded for each of the 98 
participants. The aim of this step is to determine whether a commander’s guidance can 
impact the time taken for an officer to solve a problem. While the time taken does not 
necessarily relate to the quality of the decision, it is nevertheless a critical aspect of 








IV. DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS 
A. GENERAL 
The first step of the experiment involves all participants completing 24 questions 
from the LNMTSA (Vance, 2013). Answers to these questions were used to create three 
variables (Vance, 2013): the linear score, the nonlinear score, and the thinking style 
balance (between linear and nonlinear). Adding up the responses for the three linear 
questions and dividing by three calculates the linear score. Adding up the responses for 
the 21 nonlinear questions and dividing by 21 calculates the nonlinear score. The 
nonlinear score is further subdivided into seven scores that reflect the seven components 
of nonlinear thinking. Adding up the three responses for each respective component and 
dividing by three calculates the score for each component of nonlinear thinking. The 
maximum score for linear thinking, nonlinear thinking, or any of the nonlinear thinking 
components is five. The lowest possible score is one. The overall thinking style balance 
(between linear and nonlinear) is calculated by subtracting the overall nonlinear score 
from the overall linear score. The more positive the thinking style balance score, the more 
linear dominant the participant. Conversely, the more negative the thinking style balance 
score, the more nonlinear dominant the participant. The highest possible thinking style 
balance score is 4.0, while the lowest possible score is -4.0. A strongly balanced 
linear/nonlinear profile score is between 0.5 and -0.5 (Vance, 2013). A profile is 
considered highly versatile if the thinking style balance is between 0.5 and -0.5, and the 
overall linear and nonlinear scores are each greater than 4.0. A profile is moderately 
versatile if the thinking style balance is between 0.5 and -0.5, and the overall linear and 
nonlinear scores are between 3.0 and 4.0 (Vance, 2013).  
B. PRE-VIGNETTE DATA 
The baseline data following Step One of the experiment are presented in Table 1. 
As expected, the average linear score is greater than the average nonlinear score, with an 
average thinking style balance of 0.149. Applying the aforementioned criteria for highly 




respectively. The data suggests that Hypothesis One is correct:  Military decision makers 
have a baseline thinking style that favors linear thinking over nonlinear thinking. The 
data also suggests that few (only 5.1%) of military decision makers, who are all enrolled 
in a military postgraduate education program, are considered highly versatile thinkers. 
This is further discussed in the next chapter. 
Table 1.   Average Baseline Thinking Style Scores  
VARIABLES BASELINE (pre-vignette) 
  
Average Linear Score 3.840 
Average Nonlinear Score 3.691 
Average Thinking Style Balance 0.149 
  
Average Intuitive Thinking 3.167 
Average Insightful Thinking 
 
3.429 
Average Creative Thinking 3.585 
Average Flexible Thinking 4.010 
Average Imaginative Thinking 3.939 
Average Emotional Thinking 3.997 
Average Value-Centered Thinking 3.714 
  
Number of Highly Versatile profiles 5 (5.1%) 




Observations  98 
 
The only independent variable to the baseline thinking style score in Step One of 
the experiment is the nationality of the participants. Participants were asked to identify 




participants are from the United States, while the other 24% are from nations other than 
the United States.   
It is interesting to find that the average baseline score for U.S. participants is 
0.248 higher than for their non-U.S. counterparts, as displayed in Table 2. This finding is 
statistically significant, and raises many interesting questions for future research. In 
particular, is the finding a result of training and education systems within the respective 
militaries of the participants, or is the difference in linear bias a result of factors prior to 
military service?   The significance of this finding is discussed further in Chapter V.  
Table 2.   Linear Score for U.S. Versus Non-U.S. Participants   
VARIABLES BASELINE LINEAR SCORE 
  







Standard errors in parentheses  
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1 
 
C. POST-VIGNETTE DATA 
The second hypothesis relates to Steps Two and Three of the experiment. Step 
Two involves a common vignette for all participants, followed by one of three randomly 
assigned treatments: control, linear, and nonlinear. After communicating how they would 
solve the problem in accordance with their respective treatments, participants were given 




second set of 24 questions provides post-vignette scores for linear thinking, nonlinear 
thinking, and thinking style balance. In addition, these questions also provide a score for 
each of the seven components of nonlinear thinking.   
Table 3 displays the average change for linear thinking, nonlinear thinking, and 
the seven nonlinear thinking components for each of the three treatment groups. 
Unexpectedly, Hypothesis Two was found to be false. There was not a statistically 
significant change in overall thinking style between the three treatment groups.  






 *Average Change    
    
Linear Score -0.135 
 
-0.192 -0.182 
Nonlinear Score 0.007 -0.077 -0.007 
Thinking Style 
 
-0.116 -0.095 -0.175 
    




0.219 0.152 0.162 
Creative Thinking 0.104 -0.086 0.081 
Flexible Thinking -0.115 -0.121 -0.121 
Imaginative 
 
0.135 -0.030 0.000 
Emotional 
 
-0.042 -0.212 0.061 
Value-Centered 
 
-0.156 -0.182 -0.091 
 
There is, however, a finding that provides partial support for Hypothesis Two. As 
displayed in Table 4, the linear treatment group displayed a statistically significant 
decrease in emotional thinking, which is a component of nonlinear thinking. On average, 




scores that are 0.254 lower than the control or nonlinear treatment groups. This is an 
extremely interesting finding that is further discussed in Chapter V.   
Table 4.   Linear Treatment and Emotional Thinking   
VARIABLES Post-Vignette Emotional Thinking 
  











Standard errors in parentheses  
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1  
Additional class controls not shown  
 
The final dependent variable examined is the time taken to complete the 
experiment. As expected in Hypothesis Three, the linear group took a statistically 
significant greater length of time to complete the experiment. Displayed in Table 5, the 
linear group took, on average, 171 seconds longer than the nonlinear or control groups. 
This finding is of particular interest as it contradicts a key rationale for linear thinking in 
the military—which is increased decision-making speed. This finding is further discussed 




Table 5.   Linear Group and Time Taken to Complete Experiment   











Standard errors in parentheses  
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p <.1  







Chapter IV outlined the statistically significant data from the experiment and 
introduces the findings in relation to the three thesis hypotheses. The following six key 
findings from the data analysis are discussed in this chapter: 
1. Military decision makers have a baseline thinking style that favors linear 
thinking over nonlinear thinking. 
2. A majority of the participants (52%) are below the threshold for being 
even “moderately versatile thinkers.” 
3. The baseline thinking style for U.S. officers is significantly more linear 
than for non-U.S. officers. 
4. On the one hand, the impact of framing was minimal. In particular, there 
was not a statistically significant change (pre- versus post-vignette) in 
overall thinking style between the three treatment groups (as a result of 
how the problem was framed). 
5. On the other hand, framing had two critical results. First, the linear 
treatment resulted in significantly lower emotional thinking scores (post-
vignette) compared to the control or nonlinear treatment groups. 
6. Finally, the linear treatment group took significantly longer to complete 
the experiment than the control or nonlinear treatment groups. 
Overall, the findings can be grouped into two broad categories. The first category 
includes the findings that are independent of the experiment vignette (reflecting the 
survey component of the study). These incorporate the first three findings listed above 
and represent baseline thinking characteristics of the participants. While the first 
finding—military decision makers favor linear over nonlinear thinking—was expected, 
the second and third unexpected findings provide unique insight into the baseline 
thinking styles of mid-level officers. This chapter discusses these findings with an aim to 
explain the results with the theory from Chapter II. 
The second broad category includes Findings Four, Five, and Six. These three 
findings result from the experimental study and offer insight into the effects of problem 
framing on military decision makers. The fact that problem framing did not prove to have 




yet valuable finding. This chapter discusses potential causes for this finding, focusing on 
the heuristics and biases of military decision makers. The observed decrease in the linear 
group emotional thinking is also unexpected and is discussed based on current literature 
in the field of emotional intelligence. Finally, the result that the linear group took 
significantly longer to complete the experiment is discussed, challenging a longstanding 
belief in military culture that linear thinking is faster than nonlinear thinking. 
Since this thesis is concerned with thinking style balance and fostering nonlinear 
thinking skills, the cross section of the participant pool is ideal. Assuming a lifelong 
career, officers at the O-4 level are approximately mid-way through their military service 
and have been significantly influenced by military culture and professional military 
education. Future employment will require increasingly advanced thinking skills, with an 
emphasis on strategic thought. Capturing data on participants at this rank level is valuable 
for two reasons. First, it provides a snapshot of thinking style at the mid-point of an 
officer’s career. This is tremendously valuable in that it encompasses all of the 
components that form an individual’s thinking style, including formal education, military 
culture, professional military education (PME), and life experiences, just to name a few. 
At a minimum, the data can be used to determine whether the current baseline thinking 
style for an O-4 is at a satisfactory level for optimum decision making at higher rank 
levels. Second, the data provides an indication of what, if anything, can be influenced by 
problem framing at the mid-point of an officer’s career. Nevertheless, it is important to 
recognize that additional studies need to demonstrate the generalizability of these results 
to other officers, both inside and outside of the SOF, as well as to other decision makers 
more generally. 
B. BASELINE THINKING STYLE DISCUSSION 
As presented in Chapter IV, the average baseline linear score is greater than the 
average baseline nonlinear score, with an average thinking style balance of 0.149. While 
this finding was very much expected, it is impossible to determine what causes this 
tendency towards linear thinking in the military. It is important to note that the 




Figure 1 in Chapter II, the way an individual solves problems and makes decisions is a 
complex adaptive system. Nevertheless, some of the key components of such a system 
are presented in this section, offering multiple topics for future research and additional 
experimentation. 
Starting from the beginning of an officer’s career, military recruitment and 
selection could be one contributing factor to a particular type of thinking style. It is quite 
possible that the young men and women who are attracted to military service have a 
tendency towards linear thinking. Moreover, it is possible that applicants who are 
selected for service are in part successful based on their analytical thinking abilities. If 
this is in fact the case, and if the military desires more balanced thinkers, then a logical 
first step is to focus on recruiting individuals with these attributes. A moderately versatile 
thinker would still perform well in analytical linear tasks, but they would also perform 
well in environments that require innovation and creativity. A shift towards recruiting 
officers with a more balanced thinking style would increase the pool of officers at each 
rank that have these attributes, decreasing the training burden on the military 
organization. 
Formal undergraduate university education is another aspect of an officer’s career 
that can influence their thinking style. While it is impossible for the military to control 
the university education of all officers, it is possible to influence the curriculum of the 
military academies. Even in technical degrees such as science or engineering, it would be 
prudent to include courses in design thinking and other nonlinear topics in an effort to 
promote balanced thinking at the start of an officer’s career. Unfortunately, it is a huge 
undertaking to study the feasibility and effectiveness of such an initiative, but the fact 
remains that nonlinear thinking should be introduced as early as possible.  
Despite the attributes of a new military recruit, or the curriculum of an officer’s 
undergraduate education, the most significant components that can influence an officer’s 
thinking is military culture and PME. These are also the two components that can be 
influenced by the military organization and modified accordingly to create more balanced 




Officers are systematically rewarded for linear thinking, given PME opportunities that 
foster more linear thought, then rewarded for their performance though promotion to the 
next rank. What the data shows is that linear thinking is dominant over nonlinear thinking 
before officers are even given a problem to solve. It is highly likely that the analytical 
problem solving taught in basic military training sets the tone for military thinking 
throughout one’s career. The MDMP is a highly prescriptive analytical tool for problem 
solving that offers extremely little latitude for so called “out of the box” thinking. Early 
PME is focused on MDMP, and it serves as the foundation for problem solving in 
military culture. This mindset is consistent even for PME at the O-4 level, where officers 
are instructed on the “operational” level of warfare at Command and Staff College. The 
curriculum for Command and Staff College, which is supposedly geared towards 
preparing an officer for employment at the O-5 level, is still highly linear in nature. Some 
services mention the term “design” (e.g., USMC), but this is not consistent with any 
current rendition of true design thinking. Even when learning doctrine for operational-
level planning at the brigade level and above, the processes are still overwhelmingly 
linear and analytical. The bottom line is that by the time officers are at the O-4 level, they 
have been highly influenced by PME with a very linear focus. This linear focus is 
ingrained in military culture and thus officers are reluctant to change.   
The positive aspect of this situation is that some officers are gaining exposure to 
balanced thinking. The predominant platform is through formal postgraduate education, 
with NPS serving as a perfect example. The Defense Analysis department in particular 
has embraced design thinking, offers a course in “dealing with wicked problems,” and 
encourages groups of students to work on multisemester projects utilizing strategic 
design as the primary tool. Unfortunately, however, the officers exposed to this unique 
learning opportunity represent a very small minority. Furthermore, the data suggests that 
even officers enrolled in postgraduate education may still have a strong linear thinking 
bias.  
The baseline data indicates that 5.1% of the 98 participants are highly versatile 




Under these criteria, a slight majority of the participants (52%) are below the moderately 
versatile thinker threshold. This finding is somewhat surprising considering that all 98 
participants are military officers enrolled in postgraduate education at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. While thinking style does not directly reflect on an officer’s overall 
level of intelligence, the literature does support that a lack of balance can impede 
strategic thought. A hypothesis for the lack of highly versatile thinkers is that O-3 and O-
4 officers are already well entrenched in their thinking styles. Despite potential exposure 
to balanced thinking styles at NPS, it is quite likely that a military decision maker’s 
default problem-solving approach is resistant to change. This can be partly explained 
with heuristics and biases, and is further addressed when discussing Finding Four. 
Another surprising finding is that the baseline thinking style for U.S. officers is 
significantly more linear than for non-U.S. officers (Finding Three). Once again, it is 
extremely difficult to determine what causes this result. This experiment did not test for 
potentially highly influential independent variables such as national education systems. 
For the purpose of this discussion, only factors within the sphere of military control are 
examined. Within the military organization, the two primary contributing factors to 
forming an officer’s problem-solving approach are formal institutional training (in the 
form of PME) and doctrinal processes/standard operating procedures. It is hypothesized 
that in these regards, the U.S. military may have a more linear focus when compared to 
international partners. It would be highly valuable to conduct further research that 
examines the differences and similarities of PME and military problem-solving doctrine 
between nations.  
Looking back at Figure 1 in Chapter II, the current incentive structure for both the 
U.S. and Canadian militaries is merit-based, with PME requirements at each rank level. 
The PME curriculums focus on linear and analytical processes, which directly relate to 
the planning and problem-solving doctrines employed in daily operations. It is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly the origin of the preference for linear thinking. Since linear thinking is 
so ingrained in military culture and operations, it is the focus of PME and advanced 




incentivized to employ more linear thinking. A possible intervention point to break this 
vicious cycle is presented in Chapter VI. 
C. POST-VIGNETTE THINKING STYLE DISCUSSION 
While the previous discussion looks at the survey results supporting Hypothesis 
One, what are the implications of the experimental findings regarding Hypotheses Two 
and Three? The data shows that there is not a statistically significant change (post-
vignette) in overall thinking style between the three treatment groups resulting from how 
the problem was framed, as claimed by Hypothesis Two. While this result is unexpected, 
it might be tied to the initial finding that military decision makers have a linear bias. 
Studies suggest that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgment operations” (Gartner, 1997; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974, p. 1).   
In a similar fashion, military organizations make strategic decisions based on sets 
of dominant indicators (Gartner, 1997, p. 44). These indicators represent the most 
important quantitative data to the organization and form the lens through which a given 
problem is perceived. Making decisions based on dominant indicators is in large part a 
linear process. The decision maker starts with a departure point based on pre-determined 
organizational preferences, thereby shifting focus towards these indicators in a 
predictable and systematic fashion. This pre-disposed train of thought has the potential to 
impede nonlinear thinking and offers support to the findings of Hypothesis Two.   
In particular, two heuristics are at play when the decision maker is faced with the 
experimental vignette: representativeness and availability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). 
Representativeness is when people assign probabilities that two events or processes are 
related based on the degree to which they resemble one another. For instance, when 
Event A is highly representative of Process B, the probability of A originating from B is 
judged to be high (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974, p. 2). In the context of this thesis, the 
representativeness heuristic takes hold immediately upon the officer reading the problem-
solving vignette. In this case, the event is the problem, and the process is the thinking 




representative heuristic that may help to explain Finding Four. This illusion is based on 
an unwarranted confidence that linear thinking is a good fit for solving the problem 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1974, p. 5). This unwarranted confidence is formed from a 
pattern of consistency—using linear thinking to solve military problems—that has 
developed over an officer’s career. As a result, the officer employs the thinking style that 
he deems appropriate, based on the patterns he has used and been exposed to while in the 
military. As already discussed, this finding highlights a vicious cycle that promulgates 
linear thinking regardless of the problem space. The officer is choosing his thinking style 
based on a learned pattern, as opposed to what would be optimal to solve the problem. 
Regardless of the commander’s guidance (the treatment), the representativeness heuristic 
has already set the officer down a linear thinking path. 
The second relevant heuristic to this thesis is availability. This refers to the 
tendency of people to assess frequency or probability of a particular event by the ease 
with which the decision maker can recall similar events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). 
Specifically, officers are succumbing to cognitive biases due to the retrievability of 
instances. In this case, participants are simply thinking back to similar problems they 
have been asked to solve. Given the results of Finding One—that military officers favor 
linear thinking—it is likely that similar past problems were solved using linear thinking 
techniques. Similar to the representativeness heuristic, a commander’s guidance is not 
sufficient to overcome the default thinking style employed by the officer.   
The most recent literature provides an explanation for the role of intuition in 
decision-making heuristics and biases (Kahneman, 2011, p. 4). Specifically, there is a 
focus on the flaws of intuitive thought in decision making (Kahneman, 2011, p. 10). Of 
particular importance to this thesis is the fact that “prolonged practice” and “skill” are 
critical ingredients of intuition, offering a more holistic view of what forms intuitive 
judgment. This latest research supports the idea that a military decision maker may 
indeed come to an optimum decision based on his intuition, which is formed by his skill 
and prolonged practice. The question remains, however, how does one know when 




does a military decision maker become expert enough to rely on his intuition when 
making decisions?  Even more important to consider, how does intuitive thought hinder 
nonlinear thinking that could possibly lead to a more optimum decision?  The data from 
this thesis supports the fact that individual thinking style is not easily influenced. There is 
a complex balance between intuition (skill and practice), heuristics, and biases that 
determine how a military decision maker solves a problem. It is hypothesized that a 
commander’s guidance (linear or nonlinear) is simply not sufficient to influence an 
officer’s thinking style balance. 
The fifth finding is that the linear treatment resulted in significantly lower 
emotional thinking scores (post-vignette) compared to the control or nonlinear treatment 
groups. Since emotional thinking is one of the seven components of nonlinear thinking, 
this finding does support the second hypothesis. The commander’s guidance (the 
treatment) did have an impact on emotional thinking scores. It is particularly interesting 
that rather than an increase in emotional thinking for the nonlinear treatment, there was a 
decrease in emotional thinking for the linear treatment. On average, the participants who 
received the linear treatment have post-vignette emotional thinking scores that are 0.254 
points lower than the control or nonlinear treatment groups.   
This finding suggests that an individual’s propensity to apply emotional thinking 
is actually decreased when a problem is presented with linear commander’s guidance. 
Therefore, as expected, linear problem framing has the potential to stifle components of 
nonlinear thinking, and increases uniformity of thought in a given organization. If a 
particular commander always provides highly linear guidance in line with historical and 
cultural norms, the data suggests that emotional thinking will be suppressed. This finding 
may be somewhat explained by the losses/gains frames discussed in Chapter II. 
Specifically, Kahneman and Tversky (1983) explained the framing of outcomes. They 
revealed that when a problem is viewed in a losses frame, decision makers are more risk 
seeking, while in a gains frame they are more risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). 
When a military subordinate is given a problem by his superior, the default frame is one 




accepted—organizational problem-solving tools to complete the task. Completing the 
task in accordance with the commander’s intent will be rewarded, and there is little 
incentive for taking undue risks. Even if the subordinate is inclined to apply nonlinear 
thinking—specifically emotional thinking in this case—a linear commander’s guidance 
may be enough to bring the subordinate’s thinking style back to a linear bias. Therefore, 
the gains frame of the subordinate makes him more risk averse, resulting in less incentive 
to apply nonlinear thought. 
The sixth and final finding is that the linear treatment group took significantly 
longer to complete the experiment than the control or nonlinear treatment groups. While 
this may perhaps contradict a belief in military culture that linear thinking results in faster 
decision-making, it is in fact an expected finding. The reason for this expectation is that 
problem solvers become more concerned with the process, rather than the quality of the 
solution. Similar to the explanation for Finding Five, when a subordinate receives a 
problem from his superior, there is a generally accepted doctrinal process to solve it. A 
linear commander’s guidance may go as far as demanding to see the linear process that 
was followed, essentially verifying that the decision-making status quo was adhered to by 
the subordinate.  
The result of the linear thinking expectation focuses the attention of the 
subordinate on the process, rather than finding an optimal solution. Depending on the 
subordinate’s familiarity with the preferred organizational linear process, it may take 
considerable time to think through the required steps, let alone solve the actual problem. 
The data shows that the time taken for the linear treatment group was significantly 
longer, suggesting a very strong correlation. Simply put, in addition to the 
aforementioned benefits of nonlinear thinking for decision quality, nonlinear/balanced 
guidance can also lead to faster decisions.   
The combination of these six findings provides extremely valuable insight to 
military commanders. First, as expected, subordinates will enter problem-solving tasks 
with a linear thinking bias, and the majority will fall below the threshold for being 




organizational culture evolve to embrace nonlinear thinking, the onus is on the 
commander to influence subordinates towards a balanced thinking style. While the 
commander’s guidance may not be sufficient to alter the overall thinking style balance of 
his subordinates, it does have the power to impact certain components of the decision-
making process. Specifically, linear guidance is shown to reduce emotional thinking, 
which is a key component of nonlinear thought. Furthermore, linear guidance is also 
shown to increase a subordinate’s time taken to solve a problem. This suggests that linear 
guidance may be sub-optimal for certain types of military problems, and the commander 
can indeed influence the thinking style used by his subordinates to a certain degree. 
The deficiency in military nonlinear and strategic thought can be described as a 
vicious cycle. There are numerous potential intervention points to target in an effort to 
improve military thinking, and this thesis serves to highlight one particular aspect. The 
way a superior frames a problem to a subordinate has an impact on the cognitive 
approach used to solve a problem. If a commander seeks an innovative and creative 
solution to a particular problem, it is important that his guidance is not linear in nature, 
for this has the ability to stifle balanced thinking. Furthermore, military organizations will 
only grow to accept a balanced thinking style if there is widespread exposure to and 
acceptance of this new way of military thinking. Commanders hold positions of influence 





Future research should focus on gathering data for a similar sample of civilian 
participants and officers outside of a postgraduate school setting. In particular, it would 
be valuable to determine if the majority of civilian postgraduate students would also fall 
below the threshold for being “moderately versatile thinkers.”  It would also be 
interesting to compare baseline thinking styles (pre-vignette) between military and 
civilian counterparts. A broader sample of military personnel would also add insight to 
the findings. Expanding the experiment to both lower and higher ranks, as well as 
conducting it in active duty units, would provide a richer overall sample. The higher 
baseline linear thinking scores for U.S. officers compared to their non-U.S. counterparts 
also deserve further study. Perhaps the U.S. military can look to international partners for 
professional military education practices that develop nonlinear thinking skills? 
The model for Canadian officer progression/assessment is used to explain a 
possible intervention point for disrupting the vicious cycle discussed in Chapter V. As 
displayed in Figure 1, the military focus on linear thinking, and the inherent rewards, 
ultimately trump the incentives for strategic thinking. The vicious cycle depicted by R2 in 
Figure 1 highlights the core problem, which is the officer incentive structure. It is 
important to note that the incentive structure is not unique to officers; rather, the same 
structure exists for all rank levels in the Canadian Armed Forces. This thesis, however, 
focuses on officers at the O-3/O-4 level who will soon be responsible for thinking 
strategically at higher appointments and ranks. 
A recommended way to stop the R2 cycle is to target the career-long  positive 
reinforcement that rewards linear thinking skills. The current incentive structure rewards 
O-3 and O-4 officers who can best apply the military decision-making process (MDMP) 
and operational planning process (OPP), respectively. Both the MDMP and OPP are 
highly linear analytical problem-solving tools. They form the bedrock of military 
planning, and officers who expertly apply these tools are rewarded with strong annual 




eventually result in an officer being ranked high enough among his peers for promotion. 
A balance between linear and nonlinear thinking is required to stop both the R1 and R2 
vicious cycles.   
The current Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) does not 
include any assessment criteria that reward nonlinear thinking or creativity. The initial 
recommendation is therefore quite simple. The CFPAS process should be updated to 
include criteria that are directly related to nonlinear thinking. While this intervention 
appears quite subtle on the surface, it is reasonable to believe that changing the incentive 
structure will change behavior. It is not a matter of officers under the current system 
consciously evading nonlinear thinking; rather, it is a matter of opportunity cost. Under 
the current CFPAS incentive structure, officers are simply not rewarded for 
demonstrating criteria that are not on the assessment form. Therefore, time is better spent 
on the status quo linear thinking criteria that are inherent in the incentive structure. 
Simply put: change the incentive structure, change the behavior. 
While a modified incentive structure is easy to hypothesize, facilitating such a 
change in a military institution is not without hurdles. First and foremost, the intervention 
must be data-driven, demonstrating a causal link between the incentive structure and 
desired performance. An additional experiment is recommended to study the impact of 
adding nonlinear and creative incentives to military problem solving. If experimental data 
can show a causal link, then the intervention will have a far greater chance of gaining 
support and momentum. 
The next aspect of the model of change involves a network of like-minded people 
who will support the intervention. The selection of these personnel must be methodical 
and calculating, ensuring that a strong base of support exists to champion the 
intervention. The starting point should be training and development officers (TDOs) and 
personnel selection officers (PSOs). These officers are responsible for developing 
training programs throughout the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as identifying the 
attributes and skills required for military personnel. They would be valuable resources for 




would create strong momentum for pushing this initiative. Furthermore, the involvement 
of the TDO and PSO would add heightened accountability and validity to the data gained 
from the experiment, enhancing the credibility of the entire process.   
The third aspect of the model of change is based on selecting an organization 
where there is a belief that change can occur. Ideal organizations are small units that 
embrace innovation and promulgate cultures that welcome new ideas. Such an 
atmosphere is ideal for implementing an augmented CFPAS process that will change the 



















































APPENDIX B.  RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
Good morning, 
You are receiving this email to solicit your interest in volunteering for an 
experiment in support of a research thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. The aim of 
the thesis is to identify if the way a problem is framed affects an individual’s 
psychological perception of thinking style balance (between linear and nonlinear). 
Your participation is strictly voluntary, and would entail approximately thirty 
minutes of your time. If you volunteer, you will be asked to complete a short survey and 
problem-solving vignette. There will be no personal identification data collected, and 
your responses will remain anonymous. While there is no direct benefit or incentives for 
participating in this research, your participation will help to further the understanding of 
thinking style balance in decision-making. 
If you would like to volunteer, please contact the undersigned via email to 
coordinate a time and location for your participation. 
If you have questions regarding the research, please contact Dr. Leo Blanken, 
ljblanke@nps.edu, Principal-Investigator. If you have any questions regarding your rights 
as a research subject, please contact the Naval Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry 





Major, Canadian Forces 
Defence Analysis Student 












APPENDIX C.  CONSENT FORM 
You are invited to participate in a research study at the Naval Postgraduate School 
to measure your linear/nonlinear thinking style balance. The purpose of the research is to 
better understand how the framing of a problem impacts an individual’s psychological 
perception of thinking style. Your participation should take about 30 minutes to 
complete. 
You will be asked to complete a survey, read a vignette, solve a problem, and 
complete a second survey. No tangible compensation or incentives are provided for your 
participation. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any 
questions or stop participating at anytime without penalty. The alternative to participating 
in the research is to not participate. 
Your responses are anonymous and will not be linked to your identity in any way. 
No personally identifying information will be collected – the survey only asks for broad 
demographic information and no other identifiers from participants. Any information that 
is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. 
All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information in your 
research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. 
The anticipated benefit from this study is that the findings will contribute to a 
larger body of knowledge, and can be used to optimize military problem solving. You 
will not directly benefit from your participation in this research. 
There are minimal risks associated with participation. Results of the survey will 
be used responsibly and protected against release to unauthorized persons; however, there 
is a minor risk that data collected could be mismanaged. Only the researchers will have 
access to the data, which will be stored on a password-protected computer. 
If you have questions regarding the research, or if you experience any injury or 




have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831.656.2473, lgshattu@nps.edu. 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to 
ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to 
participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and 
checking the box below, I do not waive any of my legal rights. 
 
� I consent to participate in the research study. 
� I do not consent to participate in the research study. 
 
 
Please print full name and sign below: 
 
 
_____________________________ _______________________________ _____________ 
 




APPENDIX D.  LNMTSA 
Linear/Nonlinear Multidimensional Thinking Style Assessment 




Strongly     
 Strongly  




1. I prefer to solve problems using nontraditional methods.  1  2  3 4  5  
 
2. I primarily rely on logic when making important decisions.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Whenever considering competing options, I tend to go with  
the option that is most consistent with my core values.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. I tend to alter my decision-making style according to the   
demands of the specific situation.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. When making decisions about issues with which I am very  
familiar, I often rely on my intuition rather than quantifiable,  
objective evidence.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. When preparing for an important task, I often mentally  
rehearse the major steps involved.     1 2 3 4 5  
 
7. Some of my best ideas just pop into my mind at unexpected  
moments.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. When in conflict with someone who doesn’t agree with my  
logical argument, I usually can recognize when the person’s  
underlying feelings are causing the conflict.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I like to consider new ways of doing things rather than  
remaining with the same familiar way.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. My understanding of a problem tends to come more from  
rational analysis than my intuition.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. I am inclined to use unconventional approaches to solving  
problems.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. My dissatisfaction with a situation keeps me working toward  
a satisfactory solution.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I tend to make important decisions based on my inner sense  
or intuition.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. When making important decisions, I consider my personal  
principles as much as facts, figures, and other data.  1 2 3 4 5  
 
15. When I don’t arrive at an immediate answer to a difficult  
problem, I often put the problem aside to return to it at  
another time.      1 2 3 4 5 
  





17. To solve a complex problem, I am willing to consider different  
approaches to solving the problem.     1 2 3 4 5  
 
18. I use metaphors to enhance my logical understanding of  
difficult challenges.      1 2 3 4 5  
 
19. I am at my best in challenging situations that require rational  
problem solving.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
20. When I am unable to come to a satisfactory answer to a  
problem, I often let it go for a while, and later the solution  
often suddenly presents itself when it is least expected.      1 2 3 4 5  
 
21. My perception of others’ emotions often helps me determine an  
appropriate way to interact with them.     1 2 3 4 5  
 
22. My core values are just as important for making decisions as  
logical analysis.     1 2 3 4 5  
 
23. Most people would describe me as flexible when it comes to  
adopting various approaches to solving problems.      1 2 3 4 5  
 
24. To help maintain my motivation, I like to visualize the  








Strongly     
 Strongly  
Disagree   Disagree  Neutral  Agree   
Agree  
 
25. Compared to most people, I often use other approaches to  
problem solving than those that are “tried and true.”  1 2 3 4 5 
 
26. I primarily weigh my intuition when making a decision about a  
major purchase.      1 2 3 4 5  
 
27. I often sense my rising emotions before they can interfere  
with my thinking about a problem.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
28. I most enjoy work that allows me to use my logical reasoning.      1 2 3 4 5  
 
29. When confronted with an important decision, I allow my  
feelings to influence my decision.      1 2 3 4 5  
 
30. When I start a project, I find it helpful to visualize the desired  
outcome of the project.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
31. I can easily adjust my approach to solving problems.      1  2  3 4  5 
 
32. When facing a complex problem with conflicting points of view,  
my values provide me a sense of direction.      1  2  3    4  5  
 
33. I sometimes get new ideas or solutions to problems from  
completely unexpected or unrelated sources.     1  2  3    4  5 
 
34. When my logical reasoning and feelings are in conflict, I tend  
to favor my logical reasoning.      1  2  3    4  5 
 
35. To fully understand a complex problem, I consider hard facts  
as well as my gut feelings.      1  2  3    4  5 
 
36. Much of my beneficial learning comes from insights gained  
in the course of everyday experiences.      1  2  3    4  5 
 
37. I am at my best in challenging situations that require creative  
problem solving.  1  2  3    4  5 
 
38. I have found that creating images helps me better understand  
complex problems.      1  2  3    4  5 
 
39. I prefer to let my personal principles guide my decision making.   1  2  3    4  5 
 
40. When I meet with others to make a group decision, I  
encourage a friendly atmosphere to support effective collaboration.    1  2  3    4  5 
 
41. I much prefer working on problems that require a logical,  
step-by-step approach. 1  2  3    4  5 
 
42. When possible, I prefer to break out of routine behavior and  
activities. 1  2  3    4  5 
 
43.In a volatile and changing environment, my values provide 
 me a sense of stability in making important decisions.     1  2  3    4  5 
  
44. I sometimes make decisions based on an inner certainty 
 that is difficult to explain to others. 1  2  3    4  5 
 
45. My understanding of a problem tends to come more from  




Strongly     
 Strongly  
Disagree   Disagree  Neutral  Agree   
Agree  
 
46. I often prioritize my work tasks according to how strongly  
I feel about the importance of each task. 1  2  3    4  5 
 
47. When working to solve a problem, I try to examine it in new and 
 different ways to come to an optimal solution.       1  2  3    4  5 
 
48. I often imagine a positive outcome when preparing for an  










A. Add responses on items 2, 10, 19 and divide by 3 (highest possible linear score is 5, 
lowest possible is 1).  
 
Score: _________  
 
B. Add responses on all the other items and divide by 21 (highest possible nonlinear score is 
5).  
 
Score: _________  
 




CT (Creative Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 1, 9, 11:   _______  
 
VCT (Values-Centered Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 3, 14, 22:  _______  
 
INTT (Intuitive Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 5, 13, 16:   _______  
 
INS (Insightful Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 7, 15, 20:    _______  
  
ET (Emotional Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 8, 12, 21:   _______  
 
FT (Flexible Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 4, 17, 23:   _______  
 








A. Add responses on items 28, 34, 41 and divide by 3 (highest possible linear score is 5, 
lowest possible is 1).  
 
Score: _________  
 
B. Add responses on all the other items and divide by 21 (highest possible nonlinear score is 
5).  
 
Score: _________  
 




CT (Creative Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 25, 37, 42:   _______  
 
VCT (Values-Centered Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 32, 39, 43: _______  
 
INTT (Intuitive Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 26, 29, 44:  _______  
 
INS (Insightful Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 33, 36, 45:    _______  
  
ET (Emotional Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 27, 40, 46:   _______  
 
FT (Flexible Thinking) Score: Add your score for items 31, 35, 47:   _______  
 




APPENDIX E.  EXPERIMENT VIGNETTE 
You are one of four company commanders in a battalion size unit that is preparing 
for an upcoming deployment. Given the proposed area of operations and other competing 
missions, your commander expects that he will not receive unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS) support that would typically be provided. He is reluctant to conduct the mission 
without UAS support due to the increased risk to force and decreased situational 
awareness in his operations center. Your commander has decided that an integral UAS 
capability within the battalion is the only way to ensure some level of UAS coverage for 
the upcoming mission. He also believes that a lack of external UAS support will continue 
in the coming years. Your commander has tasked you with standing up this new 
capability within your company. In order to force generate the required UAS personnel to 
man this new capability, he has authorized you to draw 15 NCOs from the other three 
companies to be employed outside their MOS.   
Your immediate task is to develop a course of action to select the most 
suitable individuals. Your commander stresses that given the autonomy and technical 
complexity of this capability, the prospective operators must have well above average 









APPENDIX F.  EXPERIMENT TREATMENTS 
Your commanding officer called you into his office and provided the following guidance: 
A. CONTROL GROUP COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE 
You are familiar with my expectations and decision-making process. Proceed 
with the task of selecting 15 NCOs for this new capability. 
B. LINEAR GROUP COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE 
You are familiar with my expectations and decision-making process. Proceed 
with the task of selecting 15 NCOs for this new capability. You know I like to see logic 
laid out in a step-by-step methodical process that follows our established doctrinal 
guidelines and unit SOPs. As always, I want to see your mission analysis as it will 
increase the confidence of my decision. Brief me weekly on your progress and keep me 
abreast of any issues you encounter. 
C. BALANCED GROUP COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE 
You are familiar with my expectations and decision-making process. Proceed 
with the task of selecting 15 NCOs for this new capability. Use existing unit doctrine and 
standard operating procedures as a departure point, but do not hesitate to include creative 
options for completing the task. I encourage you to collaborate with your peers to 









APPENDIX G.  DEBRIEF SCRIPT 
Thank you for your participation in this research study at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. Your participation will directly contribute to the body of knowledge on thinking 
style balance in military decision making. 
It must be made clear that there are no correct or incorrect responses to the 
problem-solving vignette or survey questions. Furthermore, there is no identified link 
between an officer’s thinking style balance and future performance or potential.   
If you have questions regarding the research, or if you experience any injury or 
discomfort, contact Dr. Leo Blanken, ljblanke@nps.edu, Principal-Investigator. If you 
have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval 








LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, J. L. (2001). Conceptual blockbusters: A guide to better ideas. New York, NY: 
Basic Books. 
Arquilla, J. (2008). Worst enemy: The reluctant transformation of the American military. 
Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee 
Bethel, S. A. (2013). Recruiting, training, and developing strategic thinkers. In H. M. K. 
Wolters, A. P. Grome, & R. M. Hinds (Eds.), Exploring strategic thinking: 
Insights to assess, develop, and retain Army strategic thinkers. Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Beyerchen, A. (1992). Clausewitz, nonlinearity, and the unpredictability of war. 
International Security, 17(3), 59–90. 
Bousquet, A. (2009). The scientific way of warfare. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
Boyd, J. R. (1996). The essence of winning and losing. Retrieved from 
http://pogoarchives.org/m/dni/john_boyd_compendium/essence_of_winning_losi
ng.pdf  
Clark, T., & Blew, B. (2008). Framing a problem: The problem with sound advice 
prepared in advance [Opinion piece]. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved from 
http://smallwarsjournal.com 
Conklin, J. (1996). The age of design. Napa, CA: CogNexus Institute. 
Dzbor, M., & Zdrahal, Z. (2002, July). Design as interactions of problem framing and 
problem solving. In Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (ECAI). Milton Keynes, United Kingdom: The Open University.  
Gartner, S. (1997). Strategic assessment in war. New York, NY: Yale University Press. 
Gray, C. S. (2010). The strategy bridge: Theory for practice. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Greene, R. (2006). The 33 strategies of war. New York, NY: Penguin. 
Joint Special Operations University. (2014). Special operations research topics 2014. 






Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, New  Series, 185(4157), 1124−1131. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1983). Choices, values, and frames. American 
Psychologist, 39(4), 341−350.  
Klein, G. A. (1989). Strategies of decision making. Military Review, 69(5), 56–64. 
Laich, D., & Young, M. (2011). The million-dollar muzzle: A follow-up to Yingling. 
Retrieved from http://www.defensepolicy.org/2011/laich-young/the-miliion-dollar-
muzzle-a-follow-up-to-yingling 
Liedtka, J. M. (1998). Strategic thinking: Can it be taught? Long Range Planning, 31(1), 
120–129. 
Maurice. (1984). Maurice’s strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine military strategy (G. T. 
Dennis, Trans.) Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press (Original 
work published between 580–610). 
McDermott, R. (2002). Experimental methods in political science. Annual Review 
Political Science, 5, 31–61. 
Mintzberg, H. (1994). The rise and fall of strategic planning. New York, NY: The Free 
Press. 
Murray, W., & Grimsley, M. (1994). Introduction: On strategy. In W. M. Williamson, M. 
Knox, & A. Bernstein (Eds.), The making of strategy: Rulers, states, and war. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Petersen, C. C. (1992). The strategikon: A forgotten military classic. Military Review, 8, 
70−79. 
Posen, B. R. (1984). The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
between the world wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy 
Sciences, 4, 155–169. 
Roberts, N. (2000). Wicked problems and network approaches to resolution. 






Runyon, T. C. (2004). A MDMP for all seasons: Modifying the MDMP for success. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies. 
Sanders, E. B. N. (2013). Creativity in strategic thinking. In H. M. K. Wolters, A. P. 
Grome, & R. M. Hinds (Eds.), Exploring strategic thinking: Insights to assess, 
develop, and retain Army strategic thinkers. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Schmidt, M. J. (2013). A science of context: The qualitative approach as fundamental to 
strategic thought. In H. M. K. Wolters, A. P. Grome, & R. M. Hinds (Eds.), 
Exploring strategic thinking: Insights to assess, develop, and retain Army 
strategic thinkers. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Shanker, T. (2002). A nation challenged: The military; Rumsfeld asserts forces must take 
risks and think creatively to prepare for new challenges. New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/01/us/nation-challenged-
military-rumsfeld-asserts-forces-must-take-risks-think.html 
Snyder, J. (1984). The ideology of the offensive: Military decision making and the 
disasters of 1914. Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press. 
Snyder, J. (1985). Civil military relations and the cult of the offensive. In S. Miller (Ed.), 
Military strategy and the origins of the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Spinney, C. (1999). Asleep at the switch in Versailles … or … why nonlinear realities 
overwhelm linear visions … or … why did Slobo cave? [Blog post]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/comments/c317.htm 
Spinney, C. (2005, January 26). Is America inside its own OODA loop? Defense and the 
National Interest. Retrieved from 
http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/comments/c536.htm 
Tzu, S. (1963). The art of war (S. B. Griffith, Trans.). London, England: Oxford 
University Press (Original work published 500 BCE). 
Vance, C. M. (2013). Professional military education’s imperative of linear/nonlinear 
thinking style balance for improved strategic thinking. In H. M. K. Wolters, A. P. 
Grome, & R. M. Hinds (Eds.), Exploring strategic thinking: Insights to assess, 
develop, and retain Army strategic thinkers. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 






Van Riper, P. K. (2013). The identification and education of U.S. Army strategic 
thinkers. In H. M. K. Wolters, A. P. Grome, & R. M. Hinds (Eds.), Exploring 
strategic thinking: Insights to assess, develop, and retain Army strategic thinkers. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 
Social Sciences. 
von Clausewitz, C. (1976). On war (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.) Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press (Original work published 1832). 
Wolters, H. M. K., Grome, A. P., & Hinds, R. H. (2013). Exploring strategic thinking: 
Insights to assess, develop, and retain Army strategic thinkers. Fort Leavenworth, 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
